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Translator’s Preface
Herman Bavinck (1854-l92l) was a noted
Reformed theologian, chieﬂy known for his fourvolume Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (second edition,
1906-l911). He is one of the two giants (next to
Abraham Kuyper) of the great revival of Calvinism
(sometimes called Neocalvinism) in nineteenthcentury Holland. In his later years he also published extensively in the ﬁelds of philosophy, psychology, and educational theory, and he was active
in politics.
The present paper is a translation of twenty
pages from Jan Veenhof’s dissertation on Bavinck,
titled Revelatie en Inspiratie (Amsterdam: Buijten en
Schipperheijn, 1968). Veenhof was the successor of
G.C. Berkouwer in the chair for dogmatic theology at the Free University in Amsterdam. His dissertation is a massive, 700-page work which treats
Bavinck’s doctrine of revelation in the context both
of Bavinck’s thought as a whole and of the competing theological currents of his day, especially the
so-called “ethical” movement.
Within this much broader scope, the pages
on nature and grace are only a small sub-section.
Nevertheless, they are of pivotal importance, since
they deal with what has been called “the central
theme of Bavinck’s thought.” They bring together,
in short compass, Bavinck’s major statements on
this theme, and they are put in context by a scholar
who can lay claim to being one of today’s leading
authorities on Bavinck.
However, these pages are of interest not just for
students of Bavinck’s theology: Bavinck ’s statement of the basic thesis that grace restores nature,
or that salvation means the restoration of creation,
is of far wider signiﬁcance. It puts in a succinct formulation a dimension of biblical teaching that has
been the distinctive strength of the Calvinist tradition of Christian thought, both in theology and in
a wide range of other academic disciplines.
Bavinck’s thought in general and his emphasis
on creation in particular (understood broadly in
terms of creation ordinances for all of life and reality) are also of great signiﬁcance for understanding the so-called Amsterdam school of philosophy,
which builds directly on Bavinck’s insights in this
regard. D. H. T. Vollenhoven, one of the two found-

ers of this philosophical school, became a student
of Bavinck’s at the Free University in 1911, the year
when Bavinck published his last theological book.
For the remaining decade of his life, Bavinck
turned almost exclusively to the application of
Calvinist principles to other disciplines. During
seven of these years, Vollenhoven was Bavinck’s
student and disciple, ﬁrst in theology, then in philosophy. In 1918 Vollenhoven received his doctorate with a dissertation on the philosophy of
mathematics from a theistic point of view; he then
began his life’s work of elaborating a Calvinistic
philosophy. After some years, he was joined in this
work by his wife’s brother, Herman Dooyeweerd,
a brilliant young legal theorist of Calvinist persuasion who had discovered the importance of philosophical questions for the theoretical foundations
of law. During the decade of the 1920s, the two
elaborated together the basic outline of their common philosophy, widely known as the “philosophy
of the cosmonomic idea,” a name directly linked to
the Calvinist emphasis on creation ordinances.
Central to the religious vision underlying the
cosmonomic philosophy is Bavinck’s insight that
grace restores nature, i.e., that creation is not abolished but integrally renewed by salvation in Christ.
In Vollenhoven, this insight comes out in many
typically Bavinckian formulations in his writings
and in his treatment of the good-evil distinction
as a primary dimension irreducible to any creational distinctions. In Dooyeweerd the impact
of Bavinck’s fundamental thesis can be discerned
in his formulation of the Christian “ground-motive” (Creation, Fall, Redemption) and in his analysis of the nature-grace ground-motive in Roman
Catholicism and elsewhere.
This is not to say that Vollenhoven and
Dooyeweerd have not substantially altered the
formulation of Bavinck’s insight. Bavinck’s conceptual apparatus is borrowed very largely
from Neothomism, whereas Vollenhoven and
Dooyeweerd have evolved a categorial framework
and terminology of their own, which do fuller justice to the religious intuition of Calvinism. This
framework and terminology are particularly evident
in their use of the categories “law,” “subject,” and
“direction,” which replace Bavinck’s Neothomist
categories “substance” and “accidents,” to exPro Rege—June 2006

11

press the effects of sin in creation. Where Bavinck
speaks of sin as “accidental” to the “substance” of
creation, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd speak of a
change in religious “direction” within the subjectside of creation, leaving the law-side (or “structure”) unaffected by sin.
Bavinck’s central intuition that grace restores
nature is therefore pivotal for an understanding of
both the distinctive genius of Calvinism and the
vigorous philosophical movement to which it has
given birth. It is, moreover, of great relevance to
the renewed discussion of the doctrine of creation
in contemporary theology. Veenhof’s summary of
his position is, therefore, an invaluable resource.
A few words should be said about the translation (revised 1980). Veenhof’s Dutch text has been
closely followed, with only editorial alterations.
These include the italicization of foreign words,
the attempt to bring out Biblical allusions by using the language of the King James Version (just
as Bavinck’s usage reﬂects the language of the
Statenvertaling), the insertion of headings and block
Statenvertaling
quotations to break up the text, and the expansion
of Veenhof’s bibliographical abbreviations in the
notes. There is an exception on the last point for
references to Bavinck’s four- volume Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek (Kampen, vierde druk, 1928-30), which
are simply cited in the form “I 325,” “III 85,” etc.
Furthermore, page references to English translations of Bavinck’s works have been added where
applicable, although quoted passages were, in each
case, freshly translated. Cross-references and allusions to other parts of Veenhof’s text have been
left unchanged.
The following renderings of individual words
deserve note. Wetenschap is usually translated
“scholarship,” sometimes “science.” Maatschappij is
translated “society,” although this term is potentially misleading, since it strictly refers to “civil society” (bürgerliche
bürgerliche Gesellschaft
Gesellschaft), thus excluding family,
state, and church. However, the context generally
prevents misunderstanding. It is difﬁcult to render
in English the distinction Bavinck makes between
restauratie and herstel (p. 19 ff.), since both of these
would normally be translated “restoration” in other
contexts. I have chosen to reserve “restoration” for
herstel (because of its greater frequency and to conform with English theological usage), and to use
12
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“repristination” for restauratie. The reader should
keep in mind (though my rendering now obscures
the fact) that the latter word carried strong overtones of the historically reactionary movements of
the nineteenth century and that Bavinck is consciously exploiting this pejorative connotation.
It remains for me to thank professor Veenhof
for his kindness in allowing this use of his dissertation material. This I do gladly and with full sincerity. For scores of English-speaking students, this
short paper has already been a clear window to the
distinctive strengths of Dutch Neocalvinism. For
others it has become a door. For my own part, the
translation has been a labor of love.
Addendum (2006). The above was written in
1980 and served as preface to the last revision of
this translation, which was originally done in 1977.
It was for many years available (in mimeographed
form) from the Institute for Christian Studies in
Toronto, and I am delighted that it is now, after
26 years, appearing in print in Pro Rege. In the intervening years English translations of four of
Bavinck’s publications have appeared in English,
and I have taken the opportunity of incorporating references to them in this printed version of
Veenhof’s essay. The translations in question are
the following: (1) De zekerheid des geloofs
geloofs, translated
by Harry der Nederlanden as The Certainty of Faith
(St. Catharines, ON: Paideia Press, 1980); (2) De
algemeene genade (1888), translated by Raymond
C. Van Leeuwen as “Common Grace,” Calvin
Theological Journal 24 (1989) 35-65; (3) De katholiciteit van christendom en kerk (1888), translated by John
Bolt as “The Catholicity of Christianity and the
Church,” Calvin Theological Journal 27 (1992) 22051; (4) the ﬁrst three volumes of Bavinck’s magnum
opus Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (second edition, 1906opus,
1911), translated by John Vriend under the editorship of John Bolt as Reformed Dogmatics (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003-2006). Where these
works are quoted in the following, I have not revised my translation to conform to them, but in
the footnotes I have now added, in brackets, the
appropriate page numbers of these new English
translations. Thus in “De algemeene genade, p. 21 [ET
48],” the bracketed number gives the page number
in Van Leeuwen’s English translation (ET) that
corresponds to p. 21 in the Dutch. References to

the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek are given in the form “I
330 [ET 1.360].” Unfortunately, volume 4 of the
Reformed Dogmatics has not yet appeared in English,
although its concluding section on eschatology was
published separately as The Last Things: Hope for this
World and the Next (1996). Since this section is to
be incorporated (with different pagination) in the
forthcoming fourth volume, I have refrained altogether from giving translation page references for
volume 4.
A.M. Wolters

Bavinck’s view of the
relation of nature and grace
is a central part—indeed,
perhaps we may even say
the central theme—of his
theology.1
Introduction
Bavinck’s view of the relation of nature and
grace is a central part—indeed, perhaps we may
even say the central theme—of his theology.1 We
have already come across this theme a number of
times in the above. We propose now to pay special
attention to it, at least insofar as this theme is necessary to illumine the structure of Bavinck’s doctrine of revelation.
Because the essence of the Christian religion
consists in the re-creation of the cosmos into a
kingdom of God, Bavinck writes that “the great
question, which returns always and everywhere,”
is this:
how is grace related to nature . . . what is the connection between creation and re-creation, of the
rich of the earth and the kingdom of heaven, of
humanity and Christianity, of that which is below
and that which is above? 2

It is the ancient question as to what relationship
must be established between the Gospel of Christ
and culture in the broadest sense of the word. This

question presents itself in all kinds of forms, but
it is always the same problem which is at issue, a
problem which is a matter of concern, not just to a
single period but in every age, and which
deﬁnitely does not exist only for theoretical thinking, but urges itself upon every person in the practical affairs of life. All movements and schools
which lay claim to the lives and minds of men can
be described and judged according to the position
which they take on this question of principle.3

The fact is that Bavinck reduces all divergences
among Christians to differences concerning this
fundamental problem:
Every Christian must take into account two factors: creation and re-creation, nature and grace,
earthly and heavenly vocation, etc.; and in accordance with the different relationship in which he
puts these to each other, his religious life assumes
a different character. Man’s relationship to God is
determinative of his relationship to things in general. Whoever breaks the divinely appointed connection between nature and grace is led to sacriﬁce
one to the other. Socinianism and Anabaptism,
Rationalism and Mysticism are the resulting deviant paths into which the Christian goes astray.4

This fundamental problem engaged Bavinck’s
interest from the very beginning. His ﬁrst somewhat extended statement on the problematics involved is to be found in his essay on the theology
of Ritschl. The passage concerned is especially
signiﬁcant because it sheds a revealing light on
Bavinck’s own questions and uncertainties. For the
sake of clarity, we quote it in full:
Therefore, whereas salvation in Christ was formerly considered primarily a means to separate
man from sin and the world, to prepare him for
heavenly blessedness and to cause him to enjoy
undisturbed fellowship with God there, Ritschl
posits the very opposite relationship: the purpose
of salvation in Christ is precisely to enable a person, once he is freed from the oppressive feeling
of sin and lives in the awareness of being a child of
God, to exercise his earthly vocation and fulﬁ ll his
moral purpose in this world. The antithesis, therefore, is fairly sharp: on the one side a Christian life
which considers the highest goal, now and here-
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after, to be the contemplation of God and fellowship with Him, and for that reason (always being
more or less hostile to the riches of an earthly life)
is in danger of falling into monasticism and asceticism, pietism and mysticism; but on the side of
Ritschl, a Christian life which considers its highest goal to be the Kingdom of God, i.e. the moral
obligation of mankind, and for that reason (always
being more or less averse to the withdrawal into
solitude and quiet communion with God), is in
danger of degenerating into a cold Pelagianism
and an unfeeling moralism. Personally, I do not yet see
any way of combining the two points of view, but I do know
that there is much that is excellent in both, and that both
contain undeniable truth.5

Since Bavinck himself gives expression to his
uncertainty, it is all the more of interest to examine Bavinck’s later discussions of this theme. It was
still in the same year in which the essay on Ritschl
was published, 1888, that Bavinck delivered his
rectorial oration on the catholicity of Christianity
and the church, in which he dealt extensively with
the nature-grace relation. This was supplemented
and further elaborated in the 1894 rectorial oration
on common grace. These two publications from
Bavinck’s ﬁrst period provide us with his most extensive treatment of the subject under discussion
and also undoubtedly constitute the best source for
getting to know Bavinck’s thoughts on the matter.
All the subsequent discussions in Bavinck’s writings about the relation of nature and grace (and
they are considerable) can be considered a further
explication and undergirding of his argument in
these two orations. Accordingly, it is in the ﬁrst
place from these two speeches that we have chieﬂy
drawn our materials for this section; in the notes
(and later on also in the text) we have identiﬁed and
quoted passages from other publications as well.
Confrontation with Roman Catholicism
As always, Bavinck develops his own viewpoint
in constant critical confrontation with all kinds of
schools of thought, past and present, in this case
primarily with Roman Catholicism.6 It is really
impossible to disengage Bavinck’s own views on
nature and grace from his digniﬁed but incisive
polemics. We will do well, therefore, not to leave
14
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aside this critique but to include it in our analysis.
Bavinck reminds us that the concept “world” is
used in two senses in the New Testament. Firstly,
it denotes the world insofar as the world is fallen
under the dominion of sin, but secondly, it also
denotes that same world insofar as the world has
been the object of God’s love. In this connection
he refers, among other texts, to John 3:16 and l7
— passages which play an important role in his
discussions of nature and grace.7 After the New
Testament period, however, people soon began
to deviate from this view of the world: “The two
lines which are indicated by Scripture for our view
of the world are not maintained and worked out
equally.”8 In general, the early Christians had a
strictly negative attitude toward the world and its
culture: “The second and third centuries are full
of dualism and asceticism.” The church itself, witness her rejection of Montanism and Donatism,
etc., did not want to take the road of asceticism and
separatism. She wanted to be a world church and
was successful in this, but not without having recognized and assimilated asceticism and monasticism as a legitimate element within her boundaries,
although she continued to uphold the legitimacy of
the lower ideal as well:9 “In this way the qualitative
opposition which had originally existed between
the world and the church was transformed into a
quantitative one.”10
It is at this point that the principle of the Roman
Catholic world-view comes to the fore:
In Roman Catholicism ‘the world’ more and more
loses the ethical signiﬁcance which it has in the
Scriptures. That which is natural is not sinful, but
it is that which constitutionally does not attain
the supernatural. The supernatural is a donum superadditum… Consequently Christianity and grace,
which have entered the world to enable us to attain
the supernatural, the visio Dei
Dei, do not reform and
recreate the existing order, but only complement
creation. Christianity transcendently supervenes
upon the natural, but does not penetrate and sanctify it. Thereby Roman Catholicism, which calls itself catholic in a pre-eminent sense, has altered the
nature of the catholicity of the New Testament.
The catholicity of the Christian principle, which
puriﬁes and sanctiﬁes everything, has been replaced by the dualism which puts the supernatu-

ral in a separate position alongside, or rather in a
transcendent position above the natural. Creation
and re-creation remain two independent quantities over against each other.11

Catholicism, therefore, holds to a “juxtaposition of the natural and the supernatural order.”12
As a result, “The supernatural is an order of its
own, aloof from the natural life, and sealed off
from it on all sides.”13 In all this “the genius of the
Roman Catholic system” is the principle of hierarchy. This principle explains the relatively favorable evaluation of the natural, which in Catholic
thought is good in itself; it is only incomplete and
needs complementation.14 The root of the whole
system, in Bavinck’s judgement, is to be found in
Pelagianism:
If for a moment you abstract from the supernatural order which Catholicism has built up around
the natural order, then you will have nothing left
but pure rationalism, genuine Pelagianism, and
unadulterated deism.15

The essence of the Catholic world-view is,
therefore, that the natural is good in itself but belongs to a lower order:
Catholicism therefore does indeed hold to the
catholicity of Christianity insofar as Catholicism
lays claim to the whole world and seeks to subordinate all things to the church. But this catholicity
is denied in the sense that Christianity itself must
permeate everything like a leaven. It remains an
eternal dualism, Christianity does not become an
immanent and reforming principle. This dualism
is not an antinomy, in which one pole excludes the
other. Catholicism does not annihilate the natural,
in the manner of the Manichaeans, but devalues
it. To be sure, it allows marriage, family, earthly
vocation, the state, science and art to exist, and
even gives to all of these, within the limits of their
proper spheres, a much greater freedom to move
than Protestantism does; but it depreciates and
depresses the natural; it puts on everything the
stamp of contempt and brands it as the profane.
In Catholicism the fundamental opposition is not
that of holy and unholy, but of consecrated and
profane. It reduces the ethical to the material, and
looks upon the natural as something non-divine

not because and insofar as it is impure, but because it is incapable of attaining the supernatural.
Catholicism makes the cosmos profane.16

Hence, anything that passes from the domain
of nature to that of the supernatural order must be
consecrated.17
With “this imposing Roman Catholic system
the Reformation came into collision at virtually
every point.” The sixteenth-century Reformation
was not only a reformation of the church but
also an “entirely different and new conception of
Christianity itself”: The Reformers, going back to
the New Testament, replaced the dualistic world
and life view of Catholicism, and its quantitative
opposition between the natural and the supernatural, “with a truly theistic world-view and a qualitative opposition.”18 The Reformation, “as begun
by Luther and Zwingli, and reinforced and carried

Because of the way in which
the Reformation established
the relation of nature
and grace, the cosmos of
course immediately gains
significantly in importance.
through by Calvin, put an end to the Romish supernaturalism and dualism and asceticism.”19 Because
of the way in which the Reformation established
the relation of nature and grace, the cosmos of
course immediately gains signiﬁcantly in importance. It “continues to be the primary, the original,
the natural state, to which the Christian religion,
the foedus gratiae, is intended to lead back”:20
The Reformation gave us a clearer understanding not only of the articles of faith concerning
the Father and the Holy Spirit, concerning the
church and forgiveness; it also rehabilitated the
ﬁrst article of our ecumenical Christian faith, and
gave full weight to the confession: “I believe in
God, the Father, Almighty, Creator of heaven
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and earth.” In this they rediscovered the natural,
restored it to its rightful place, and freed it from
the Roman Catholic stigma of being profane and
unconsecrated. The natural is not something of
lesser value and of a lower order, as though it were
not susceptible to sanctiﬁcation and renewal, but
rather required only to be bridled and repressed. It
is just as divine as the church, though it owes its
origin not to re-creation but creation, though it is
not from the Son but from the Father. 21

In this way, the mechanical relation of nature and
grace is replaced in Protestantism by an ethical
one:
Christianity is not a quantitative entity which hovers transcendently above the natural, but a religious and ethical power which enters immanently
within the natural and banishes only that which is
impure. The Kingdom of heaven may be a treasure and a pearl; it is also a mustard seed and a
leaven.22

This principial divergence between Roman
Catholicism and the Reformation comes into sharp
focus in the contrast with respect to the concept of
grace. In Catholicism, writes Bavinck, grace has a
double task: ut elevet et sanet
sanet. But the ﬁrst completely
overshadows the second. Grace is necessary absolutely in the ﬁrst sense, but only per accidens in the
second:
Grace in Catholicism is in the ﬁrst place a quality which is added to man above and beyond the
natural order, and through which he is in principle taken up into a supernatural order, becomes
a participant in the divine nature and the vision
of God, and is enabled to accomplish the kind of
supernatural works which ex condigno earn eternal
life.23

The Reformation, however, rejected the Neoplatonic mysticism underlying this conception, of
which the most important thing is the elevation of
man above his nature, his deiﬁcation; it
returned to the simplicity of Holy Scripture, and
therefore acquired an entirely different conception of grace. Grace does not serve to take man
up into a supernatural order, but to liberate him
from sin. Grace is not opposed to nature, but only

16

Pro Rege—June 2006

to sin. Properly speaking, it was not necessary for
Adam before the Fall, but has become necessary
only because of sin; therefore it is not necessary
absolutely, but only per accidens. The physical opposition of natural and supernatural is replaced by
the ethical one of sin and grace.

The function of grace is exclusively the removal
of sin; if this happens, then man is automatically
image of God again, for the image of God is not
a donum superadditum but belongs to the essence of
man. “There is thus no need for there to be, next
to the grace which delivers from sin, another grace
which moreover elevates man above his nature.”24
A corollary of this is that grace in Reformation
theology in no way can have the character of a substance. For that matter, the mere fact that sin is
not a substance, and has not deprived man of anything substantial, means that grace can never be
conceived of as a substance:
It is a restoration of the forma that was impressed
upon man and creatures in general at creation.
Re-creation is not a second, new creation. It does
not add any new creatures to the existing order,
or introduce a new substance, but it is essentially
reformation. In this the operation of grace extends
intensively as far as the power of sin. Sin has affected everything; it has “corrupted the whole organism of creation, the very nature of creatures;
and therefore grace is a power of God which liberates mankind from sin also inwardly in the core of
its being, and shall one day present it without spot
or wrinkle before God’s face.25

Confrontation with
Other Protestant Traditions
The change which was effected by the
Reformation in the Roman Catholic world-view
was indeed nothing less than a complete revolution. In Bavinck’s view, however, there did not
exist a complete harmony among the Reformers.
While Luther and Zwingli, each in his own way,
were still caught in dualism to a certain extent,
it remained for Calvin to overcome this dualism. Bavinck is not without criticism vis-à-vis the
Genevan Reformer, but this criticism does not prevent him from giving expression to his profound

admiration for Calvin. It was Calvin, according to
Bavinck, whose reforming labors
completed the Reformation and saved
Protestantism. Calvin traced the operation of sin
to a wider extent than Luther, to a greater depth
than Zwingli. But it is for that reason that the
grace of God is more restricted in Luther, less
rich in Zwingli, than it is in Calvin. In the powerful mind of the French Reformer, re-creation is
not a system which supplements creation, as in
Catholicism, not a religious reformation which
leaves creation intact, as in Luther, much less a
new creation, as in Anabaptism, but a joyful tiding
of the renewal of all creatures. Here the Gospel
comes fully into its own, comes to true catholicity.
There is nothing that cannot and ought not to be
evangelized. Not only the church, but also home,
school, society and state are placed under the dominion of the principle of Christianity.26

With complete conviction, Bavinck chooses
Calvin’s position and makes it his criterion for judging all kinds of movements and schools that have
arisen in the history of the church and theology.
Thus, he detects the inﬂuence of Roman Catholic

While Luther and Zwingli,
each in his own way, were
still caught in dualism to a
certain extent, it remained
for Calvin to overcome this
dualism.
dualism in the Socinians and Anabaptists: “The
former disregarded the gratia specialis and were left
with nothing but nature; the latter despised the
gratia communis and knew of nothing but grace.”27
These two movements exerted a powerful inﬂuence also within the churches of the Reformation.
The inﬂuence of Anabaptism can be shown, for
example, in Pietism, the Moravian Church and
Methodism.”28 Bavinck does not want to detract in

the least from the great achievements of the leaders and pioneers of these movements. Nevertheless
he ﬁnds something missing in their Christianity:
“The genuine, true catholicity of Christianity is
missing.” In all these movements
there prevails a restrictive, ascetic view of the
world and all its culture. Whether they withdraw
themselves into isolation in the Pietist manner,
or attack the world in Methodist fashion and attempt to conquer it by main force, never do we
ﬁnd here genuine, true, full reformation; there is
only a rescuing and snatching of individuals out
of the world which lies in wickedness; never a
methodical, organic reformation of the whole, of
the cosmos, of the nation and country. In all these
movements there is an attack on the component
parts, not on the centre; on the ramparts, not on
the fortress itself.

Bavinck characterizes their struggles as “guerilla
warfare, weakening the enemy here and there, but
not gaining the victory.” The world and culture
were left to their own devices.29
The “glorious truth” of Pietism and related religious movements is that the kingdom of heaven
must count as the highest priority. However, the
mystical aspect of Christianity must be kept in balance with the ethical, genuinely human aspect:
Faith appears to be great, indeed, when a person
renounces all and shuts himself up in isolation.
But even greater, it seems to me, is the faith of the
person who, while keeping the kingdom of heaven
as a treasure, at the same time brings it out into the
world as a leaven.30

Liberal theology wanted to restrict Christ’s power
and word to the heart and the inner chamber, appealing to the fact that his kingdom was not of this
world. However, “though it is not of this world, it is
in this world and meant for it.”31 The non-Christian
world wants the Christians to withdraw themselves
into isolation and to give the world peace and freedom of movement;
But the catholicity of both Christianity and the
church prevents us from complying with this desire... To be sure, the kingdom of God is not of
this world, but it does require that everything be
subservient to it. It is exclusive, and does not coun-
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tenance any independent or neutral realm of the
world alongside it.32

Bavinck is evidently fearful of the danger that a
one-sided pietistic attitude would unintentionally
abet the secularization of human life advocated
by modernism and positivism. For that reason,
he does not hesitate to point out the dark side, or
rather the fundamental mistake, of this pietism,
namely the avoidance of the battle in the social and
political arena, and in scholarship.33 In this Bavinck
is opposing, among other things, the introverted
attitude, the inclination toward otherworldliness
and suspicion of culture, which he observed in the
circles of his own Afgescheiden Reformed church.34
He states emphatically that contempt for created
life is wrong: “it is in conﬂict with both Scripture
and experience.” We must adopt the biblical position, which ﬂatly contradicts this negative evaluation; “Every kind of separatism and asceticism is
thereby cut off at the root. All otherworldliness
and world-ﬂight is a denial of the ﬁrst article of
the Apostle’s creed.”35 When Bavinck discusses the
biblical appreciation of created life, he very often
refers to 1 Timothy 4:4-5 and 1 John 3:8 (“the Son
of God was manifested, not that He might destroy
the works of the Father, but that he might destroy
the works of the devil, in order thus to restore the
works of the Father”). The whole world, then, has
been given over to corruption through sin, but
through grace it is also being saved in its entirety from sin: “Sin came into the world
world; that is also
why God loved the world
world.” The word of liberation
which comes to us in Christ is therefore not law
but gospel: “It is grace alone. And this grace does
not abolish nature, but afﬁrms and restores it.”36
This last phrase expresses the heart of
Bavinck’s view of the relation of nature and grace.
All Bavinck’s reﬂections about this relation can be
brought back to this point of departure. This explains the fact that Bavinck brings it up repeatedly
in all kinds of formulations. It is the central theme
that recurs in numberless variations, the refrain
that is unceasingly repeated, the leitmotif which we
hear everywhere. By way of illustration, we adduce the following quotations (a selection from the
many that could be given), which bring this central
theme to expression. Bavinck writes,
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Pro Rege—June 2006

So Christianity did not come into the world to
condemn and put under the ban everything which
existed beforehand and elsewhere, but quite the
opposite, to purify from sin everything that was;
and thus to cause it to answer again to its own nature and purpose.37

Because revelation is soteriological in content,
It does not mean an annihilation, but a restoration of God’s sin-disrupted work of creation.
Revelation is an act of reformation; in re-creation
the creation, with all its forms and norms, is restored; in the gospel, the law; in grace, justice; in
Christ, the cosmos is restored.38

Salvation in Christ is “not a second, new creation,
but a re-creation.” Bavinck continues with these
striking words:
It would have been much simpler if God had destroyed the whole fallen world and replaced it with
an entirely new one. But it was His good pleasure
to re-establish the fallen world, and to liberate
from sin the same mankind which had sinned.39

In Roman Catholicism, Christianity may still
be Erlösungsreligion, but “it is in the ﬁrst place not
reparatio, but elevatio naturae.”
.”40 However, according to Bavinck’s reformational conviction, salvation is precisely reparatio of created, natural life.
That is why he can maintain the position, over
against Roman Catholicism as well as Pietism and
Methodism, that nature as God’s creation “is in
itself of no less value than grace.” The Holy Spirit,
who acts in continuity with God’s directives in natural life, “seeks by His grace to restore the whole
of natural life, to liberate it from sin and to hallow it to God.”41 “The kingdom of God is hostile
to nothing but sin alone.”42 This insight makes it
possible for Bavinck to replace the predominantly
ontological and metaphysical Roman Catholic conception with a much more religious and existential
approach to the problematics. Consider only the
following remarkable statement:
Grace and sin are opposites; the latter is overcome
only by the power of the former; but as soon as the
power of sin is broken (and in the same measure
that it is) the opposition between God and man
disappears.43

Grace militates against sin in the natural, but it
does not militate against the natural itself; on the
contrary, it restores the natural and brings it to its
normal development, i.e. the development intended by God.44
It is therefore a mistake to suppose that grace is
restrictive of the capacities and abilities inherent in
human nature or renders them inoperative. In an
important discussion about revelation and reason,
Bavinck argues that there can be no deactivation
of reason by revelation: “Grace does not repress
nature, including the reason and understanding
of man, but rather raises it up and renews it, and
stimulates it to concentrated effort.”45
Special Aspects of Bavinck’s View
a) Trinitarian
A number of aspects of Bavinck’s conception
merit separate attention. In the ﬁrst place, it should
be mentioned that Bavinck puts his basic theme in
a Trinitarian context. The confession of the Father
as Creator “afﬁrms the value of the natural in its
own right; the divine origin of all that exists; the
original goodness of the world, and within that
world of family and society, of scholarship and art,
of commerce and industry. There is nothing sinful in itself.” “Because sin does not belong to the
substance of creation, but is a deformation of that
which exists, God can still love the world in spite
of the corruption brought about by sin; it still remained His creation, and to that degree good. And
He has loved the world “with eternal and almighty
love.”46 The love of the Father is evident from the
giving of His Son, and the love of the Son is evident from His acceptance of the death of the cross
for the sake of the restoration of God’s creation:
The grace of the Son therefore extends as far as
the love of the Father. It is just as deep in content,
just as wide in extent, just as powerful in effect.
Nor are any greater limitations put on the regenerating and renewing activity of the Holy Spirit...
He grants His indwelling and fellowship to everything which the Father has loved, and which the
Son has bought with His blood.47
No other limit is put to the love of the Father,
the grace of the Son and the fellowship of the Holy
Spirit than that which is established in the ever

wise and holy counsel of God. No domain of life
is excluded from re-creation. Nothing is in itself
beyond redemption or reconciliation. There need
be no despair about any of God’s creatures.48

Within the Trinitarian context an important
place goes to the Christological dimension of the
theme. Bavinck’s Christocentric conception of special revelation, in combination with his conviction
concerning the universal soteriological purpose of
this revelation, manifests its full signiﬁcance at this

Grace militates against
sin in the natural, but it
does not militate against
the natural itself; on the
contrary, it restores the
natural and brings it to its
normal development, i.e.
the development intended
by God.44
point. The universal range and scope of Christ’s
deliverance is based on the “soteriological concentration” of Christ’s person and work. Jesus, says
Bavinck, was not a new legislator, no statesman, no
philosopher, etc., but only Jesus, i.e., Savior:
But that He was completely and entirely, not
in the narrow sense of Roman Catholics, and
Anabaptists and Lutherans, but in the full, deep,
broad Reformed sense. Christ did not come only
to restore the ethical-religious life of man, and to
leave all the rest untouched as though this had not
been corrupted by sin and did not stand in need of
restoration. No, the love of God, the grace of the
Son and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit extend
as far as sin.49

To be sure, the soteriological concentration of
Christ’s work may never be lost sight of. Nothing
can be compared with the Kingdom of God, which
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He establishes; he who wishes to enter it must deny
everything: “the cross is the condemnation of the
world and the sentence of death upon all sinful
culture.” But it is a mistake, Bavinck continues, to
deduce from this proclamation “that the gospel is
hostile to culture.” The gospel of the kingdom may
not be isolated from the organic context in which it
occurs in history and Scripture. For Christ does not
stand at the beginning but makes His appearance
in the center of history. He presupposes the work
of the Father in creation and providence, including
speciﬁcally His guidance of Israel. In fact, Christ is
the same One Who, as the Word, made all things
and, in particular, was the life and light of all men.
If, therefore, Christ was exclusively proclaimer and
founder of the Kingdom, Bavinck observes,
then He cannot have come to destroy the work of
the Father, to destroy His own work in creation
and providence, but on the contrary, to save it
from the destruction which man by his sin has inﬂicted upon it.50

In the second place, the proclamation of Jesus
may therefore not be isolated either from that
which followed it after the cruciﬁxion. The humiliated One is the exalted One:
In His exaltation He takes back what He had
denied in His humiliation, but now freed from
guilt, cleansed from every spot, regenerated and
renewed by the spirit. The resurrection is the restoration in principle of all culture.

For Christ accepted the body in which He had
borne the sin of the world on the cross.51 In the
resurrection Bavinck sees his foundational conviction conﬁrmed. He puts it in the following pithy
formulation:
The bodily resurrection of Christ from the dead is
conclusive proof that Christianity does not adopt a
hostile attitude towards anything human or natural, but intends only to deliver creation from all
that is sinful, and to sanctify it completely.52

It is worthy of note that Bavinck, in this respect, also attaches great weight to the incarnation
as such, i.e., irrespective of cross and resurrection.
It is instructive what he says about the connection
between the denial of Christ’s human nature and
20
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the contrasting of nature and grace. The denial of
the genuine and complete human nature always
proceeds, in his view, from a certain dualism, and
therefore undermines the confession concerning
the Creator and the catholicity of the Christian
religion.53 On the other hand, the unqualiﬁed afﬁrmation of Christ’s humanity implies, at least in
principle, a correct conception of the relation of
nature and grace because it makes impossible the
devaluation of the earthly and human. The incarnation teaches that the divine can reveal itself in
a completely human manner.54 This contains the
further implication, of no small importance, that
while the human does constitute the organ of sin,
the human is not sin itself.
Scripture, writes Bavinck, “maintains, also in
the incarnation, the goodness of creation and the
divine origin of matter.”55 The incarnation in principle implies “the overcoming of all dualism, the
condemnation of ascetism....”56 Kuitert is right to
speak of Bavinck’s “anti-spiritualism.”57
b) Sin/Grace not Substantial
Another important component of Bavinck’s
conception is his heavy emphasis on the fact that
grace can restore nature, since sin, no matter how
much it may have permeated every sector of created life, is nevertheless “accidental” in the philosophical sense of not belonging to the essence or
substance of things. Sin is
not a substance, but a quality; not materia,, but forma ;
it is not the essence of things, but rather adheres to
the essence; it is a privatio, though a privatio actuosa,
and to that extent contingent, an alien intruder
like death. It can therefore be isolated from the
essence and removed from it. The world is and remains susceptible to puriﬁcation and deliverance.
Its essence can be saved, and its original state can
return.58

It is a distinguishing mark of the Christian religion
that it maintains the purely ethical nature of sin, and
it is enabled to do this by the distinction it makes
between creation and Fall. In all systems which
identify sin with the substance of things, creation
is denatured to a Fall.59 In Bavinck’s judgement,
none of the non-Christian religions have succeeded in avoiding this identiﬁcation of creation and

Fall and thus the substantial conception of sin. For
him only one religion gives the true perspective on
this point, and that is Christianity:60
It is Christianity alone, among all religions, which
has conceived of sin as being purely religious and
ethical, as being sin, has detached it from substance of every kind, and has distinguished it from
all physical evil.61

Now it is owing to this ethical conception of sin
that the view can be maintained that grace restores
nature. For in this view sin, because it is not a sub-

In Bavinck’s judgement,
none of the non-Christian
religions have succeeded in
avoiding this identification
of creation and Fall
and thus the substantial
conception of sin.
stance, could not alter the essence, the substance
of creation either. Man as sinner still remains man,
and similarly all other creatures, in spite of sin and
the reign of corruption, have remained the same
in substance and essence. And because sin has not
taken away substance, grace does not, as we have
seen, give back substance.
The materia of all things is and remains the same,
but the forma, given in creation, was deformed
by sin, to be once again completely reformed by
grace.62

The non-substantial character of grace is intimately
allied to the non-substantial character of sin.
c) Reformation, not revolution
The next motif to which we draw attention is
closely connected with the foregoing. We refer to
the fact, frequently and forcefully underscored by
Bavinck, that the reformation which Christ brought about
by His revelation differs fundamentally from revolution.

Moses and the prophets, Christ and the apostles
“discriminated in an inimitable manner between
healthy and sick reality.” Whereas in other religions
and philosophical systems “these two spheres” are
constantly confused and mixed together, the special revelation that comes to us in Christ
keeps the two in clear distinction; it acknowledges
nature, everywhere and without reservation, but it
nevertheless joins battle with sin on every front. It
seeks the reformation of natural life, always and
everywhere, but only for the purpose and by the
means of liberating it from unrighteousnss.63

This insight is also determinative for the assessment of concrete events and movements in social
and political affairs:
Because the gospel is concerned exclusively with
liberation from sin, it leaves all natural institutions
intact. It is in principle opposed to all socialism,
communism and anarchism, since these never
oppose only sin, but identify (through the denial
of the Fall) sin with nature, unrighteousness with
the very institution of family and state and society,
and thus creation with the Fall. For the same reason the gospel is averse to revolution of any kind
which arises out of the principle of unbelief, since
such revolution, in its overthrow of the existing
order, makes no distinction between nature and
sin, and eradicates the good together with the bad.
The gospel, by contrast, always proceeds reformationally. The gospel itself brings about the greatest reformation, because it brings liberation from
guilt, renews the heart, and thus in principle restores the right relation of man to God.64

What Bavinck calls “the greatest reformation”
is the pivot, the dominating centre. But out of this
centre the gospel “makes a reforming and renewing impact on all earthly institutions.” The gospel,
after all, is a “gospel,” “glad tidings for all creatures; not an announcement of destruction and
death, but of resurrection and life.” The gospel attacks sin alone, but it attacks sin always and everywhere. Now,“by liberating all social conditions and
institutions from sin, it also seeks to restore them
all according to God’s will, and to make them answer to their own nature.” As a result, the gospel
avoids, on the one hand, the danger of conservaPro Rege—June 2006
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tism, which refuses to give attention to change in
society, and, on the other hand, revolutionary radicalism, which lacks any constant standpoint in the
ﬂux of events.65 Though averse to every kind of
revolution, the Gospel is “all the more concerned
for reformation.” In its struggle—not against nature as such, but against sin and falsehood—“it
proclaims principles which, not through revolutionary, but through moral and spiritual means,
have their effect everywhere, which reform and renew everything.” It is “a leaven which leavens everything...; a principle which recreates everything;
a power which overcomes the world.”66
d) Restoration, not repristination
A further important point of view is that the
redemption by grace of created reality, the reformation of nature, is not merely repristination
repristination, but
raises the natural to a higher level than it originally occupied
occupied.
In the future, Bavinck writes, the “original order”
will be restored. Not, however,
as though nothing had happened, as though
sin had not existed, and the revelation of God’s
grace in Christ had never occurred. Christ gives
more than sin took away; grace did much more
abound.67

Bavinck is here not indirectly making a case for the
notion of an elevation of the natural, as in Roman
Catholic theology and elsewhere.68 We must take
into consideration the fact that, according to the
conception of Reformed dogmatics (a conception
to which Bavinck subscribes), Adam did not yet
possess the greatest height: material freedom, the
inability any longer to err, to sin, or to die.
The pre-Fall situation of man, and of the whole
earth, was a temporary one, which could not remain as it was. It was of such a nature that it could
be raised to a higher glory, but could also, in case
of man’s transgression, be made subject to vanity
and corruption.69

Although the latter occurred through sin, grace intends to bring the situation of man and the world
to this higher glory. The fact must not be neglected, however, that this higher glory constitutes the
goal to which the earth had been directed from the
beginning. Therefore it is certainly not added to the
beginning
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creation as a foreign component. For that reason
Bavinck’s thesis that reformation through grace
is more than mere repristination is no denial of his
foundational principle that grace restores nature.
Bavinck writes that grace
does not grant anything beyond what Adam, if he
had remained standing, would have acquired in
the way of obedience. The covenant of grace differs from the covenant of works in the road, not in
its ﬁnal destination. The same beneﬁts are promised in the covenant of works and freely given in
the covenant of grace. Grace restores nature and
raises it to its highest fulﬁ llment, but it does not
add a new, heterogeneous component to it.70

In Bavinck’s view there is succession and progression, development and ascent in the works of
God:
There is a movement from creation through redemption to sanctiﬁcation and gloriﬁcation. The
point of arrival returns to the point of departure,
and is simultaneously a high point elevated high
above the point of departure. The works of God
describe a circle which strives upward like a spiral;
they are a combination of the horizontal and the
vertical line; they move forward and upward at the
same time.71

It is not necessary, at this point, to explore in
greater depth the inﬂuence of Bavinck’s fundamental theme on the different loci of dogmatic
theology.72 We only point out that the thesis concerning the restoration of nature by grace, in combination with the insight that reformation is more
than repristination, is constitutive for Bavinck’s
eschatology.73
Practical Consequences
To complete the overall picture, and to bring it
into sharper focus, it remains for us to pay special
attention to what Bavinck himself indicated were
the practical consequences of his fundamental theme,
a number of which have already been mentioned
in passing in the foregoing discussion. In the ﬁrst
place, we can observe that in this conception the
independence of the different societal spheres is
fully honored, while at the same time the salutary
effect of the gospel in all these spheres is emphati-

cally underscored. Family, society, and state arise
out of creation, according to Bavinck, and exist by
virtue of gratia communis. Bavinck evidently agrees
fully with Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty. It
is also his conviction that sovereignty in these “organic life-spheres” descends directly from God to
created reality and that each has a God-given authority of its own.74 This authority does not in the
least imply that the spheres in question have nothing to do with the gospel. On the contrary, they
have been corrupted by sin and therefore need the
word of God as rule and guide:
But here again grace does not annul nature.
Family, society, and state do experience regeneration by the Spirit of Christ, but they exist and live
by virtue of the order of God in nature and retain their full independence alongside the church.
Christ did not come to destroy the world and the
various spheres of life within it, but to restore and
save them.

The same is true of art and scholarship:
They, like man himself, are conceived and born in
sin; but they are not sinful and unclean in themselves. They can be sanctiﬁed by the word and the
Spirit of Christ. Also for these mighty factors of
civilization the gospel is a word of salvation and
blessing.75
But here too re-creation is something other than
creation. Art and scholarship have their principium
not in the special grace of regeneration and conversion, but in the natural gifts and talents which
God in His common grace grants also to unbelievers.76

The gospel of Christ only serves to liberate art and
scholarship from sin and falsehood and to make
them answer to their true purpose.77
Bavinck thus consciously and intentionally
rejects two approaches to the question of the nature-grace relation that have often been taken in
the practice of life. On the one hand, he rejects
the Roman Catholic attempt to have natural life
overarched by a sacral, supernatural superstructure. In this way, grace remains suspended above
nature. On the other hand, he resists every conception which tends to enclose the gospel within the

province of the spiritual life, narrowly conceived,
and thus to contrast it with life in the world and
human culture. This can happen on the basis of
the presuppositions of either an extreme Pietism
or a Kantian dualism. The difference between the
two, however important in other respects, is irrelevant with respect to the point at issue, insofar
as life in the world and human culture is in both
cases withdrawn from the effective inﬂuence of

…he resists every conception
which tends to enclose the
gospel within the province of
the spiritual life, narrowly
conceived, and thus to
contrast it with life in the
world and human culture.
the gospel. In this way, grace continues to stand
next to nature. In opposition to this view, Bavinck
argues that grace penetrates into nature and puriﬁes
it from within. For that reason the gospel cannot
stand over against nature.
Sin it condemns, always and everywhere, but marriage and family, society and state, nature and history, art and scholarship, it holds dear. Despite the
many failings of those who confess the gospel, it
has been through the centuries a rich blessing for
all these institutions and activities. The Christian
peoples still continue to be the bearers of culture.78

To be sure, the gospel is no social or political program, no textbook for science or art; it is the book
of God’s redemptive revelation, and as such, it has,
as we shall see more clearly shortly,79 a religio-ethical purpose. But precisely in its soteriological concentration, the gospel attains a universal range and
scope and has a redemptive impact on the totality
of human life. Bavinck willingly subscribes to the
view of Calvin, who saw in Christianity
not merely a principle of new spiritual life, but
also an element, the most important element, of
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culture; to him the Gospel was good news for all
creatures, including family, society, scholarship
and art.80

From this vantage point, we can also understand
the vocation of believers in the world. Bavinck’s
view of this vantage point can perhaps be formulated as follows: the soteriological concentration of
Christ’s work and word, and the universal range
and scope that is based upon it, must be reﬂected
in the lives of believers in such a way that the faithrelation with Christ constitutes not only the decisive pre-condition but also the driving force for the
unfolding of created reality in meaningful cultural
work. The faith-relation with Christ through the
gospel is primary. Man must ﬁrst become son of
God again, before he can become “a cultural creature” in the true sense of the word.81 But once he is
son of God, he can also dedicate himself to culture
again. With evident agreement he quotes the epigrammatic words of Johann Christoph Blumhardt
to the effect “that man must be converted twice,
ﬁrst from the natural to the spiritual life, and
thereafter from the spiritual to the natural life.”82
The disciples of Christ do have a calling to bear
their cross, to deny themselves, and to follow their
Master, but not to practice asceticism and otherworldliness. They must adopt a positive attitude
toward earthly life. It is precisely this which was
also the intention of the Reformation:
a Christianity which was hostile, not to nature, but
only to sin.... In the Reformation the old adage
came into its own again: natura commendat gratiam,
gratia emendat naturam.83

Conclusion
Thus, to believers living in fellowship with
Christ, the way is opened again to the whole arena
of human affairs. All things are theirs, Bavinck
writes, inasmuch as and insofar as they are Christ’s,
and Christ is God’s. The reference is to a Pauline
text that Bavinck often cites in this context: 1
Corinthians 3:23.84 Especially in his ﬁne essay on
the certainty or assurance of faith, Bavinck has
made some beautiful observations about this vocation of believers within the broad horizons of
human life. On this point too he is critical of the
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negative evaluation of social and cultural affairs in
the circles of the earlier Pietistic Christians.85 There
can be no doubt that Bavinck is far from poking
fun, in the well-known manner (whether with supercilious arrogance or sardonic irony, from the
vantage point of a real or imagined cultural superiority), at this Pietistic life style, as at an anachronistic curiosity. He is, rather, of the opinion that this
Pietism holds up the mirror to ourselves and opens
our eyes to the dangers of an unbridled and unbroken cultural optimism – dangers which Bavinck
knew only too well were certainly not imaginary in
the circles of his occasionally overzealous fellowCalvinists. It was his conviction that “this movement [Pietism] gives evidence of an appreciation
and concern for the one thing needful, which is
only too often absent from us in the busy rush of
contemporary life.”86 Against the Pietists, nevertheless, he maintains that the signiﬁcance of the
Christian religion may not be restricted to the redemption and salvation of a few souls.
The religious life does have its own content and
an independent value. It remains the center, the
heart, the hearth, out of which all his [i.e., the
Christian’s] thought and action proceeds and from
which it receives inspiration and warmth. There,
in fellowship with God, he is strengthened for his
labor and girds himself for the battle. But that hidden life of fellowship with God is not the whole
of life. The prayer room is the inner chamber,
but not the whole dwelling in which he lives and
moves. The spiritual life does not exclude domestic
and civic, social and political life, the life of art and
scholarship. To be sure, it is distinct from these
things, it also transcends them by far in value, but
it does not constitute an irreconcilable opposition
to them; rather, it is the power which enables us
faithfully to fulﬁ ll our earthly vocation and makes
all of life a serving of God.

Here again Bavinck impresses upon his readers that
the kingdom of God is a pearl of great price but, at
the same time, a leaven. “Faith is not only the way
of salvation, it is also the victory over the world.”87
It is in that conviction that the Christian stands
and labors – the Christian as he is pictured in
the Scriptures, as he makes confession in the
Heidelberg Catechism. Being reconciled with

God, he is reconciled with all things. Because
he confesses the Father of Christ, the Almighty,
Creator of heaven and earth, he cannot be narrow
in heart or “straitened in his bowels.”88
A priest in the Lord’s temple, the believer is
therefore king of the whole earth. Because he
is a Christian, he is a man in the full and truest
sense.89

Man must first become
son of God again, before
he can become “a cultural
creature” in the true sense
of the word.81 But once he
is son of God, he can also
dedicate himself to culture
again.
In complete agreement with the Reformers,
Bavinck holds that we must exercise our Christian
faith, in the ﬁrst place, in the faithful fulﬁllment of
our earthly vocation:
Roman Catholicism sees the full realization of the
Christian ideal of life in the monk, in the man who
leaves his natural vocation and devotes himself exclusively to spiritual things.90

Moreover, Bavinck notes, “this conception has
also had a profound inﬂuence in our Protestant
circles.” To this conception, according to which a
person must do something extraordinary to be a
true Christian and seems to be a Christian “to the
same degree that he ceases to be man,” Bavinck
takes sharp exception.91 Also in the practice of
the Christian life, we must take seriously the fact

that grace restores the natural
natural. Continually and
emphatically, Bavinck insists that the Christian is
the true man, is truly human. As directed to nonChristians, this meant: to be truly human, in accordance with your Creator’s purpose, you must
have faith! As directed to his fellow-Christians, it
meant: if you are a Christian, a Christian in the full
sense of the word, then you are no peculiar, eccentric human being, but you are fully human. To be
Christian means to be human. It is man’s humanity
that is redeemed. In this connection Bavinck frequently adduces 2 Timothy 3:17: “that the man of
God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all
good works.”92 Bavinck is fully conscious of the
fact that the relation of “human” and “Christian”
poses difﬁcult problems, both in theory and practice:
We continually err on the side of the right or on
the side of the left. One moment we sacriﬁce the
Christian to the human, and the next we sacriﬁce
the human to the Christian. On the one side looms
the danger of worldliness, on the other side that of
otherworldliness. Often the Christian life lurches
on an unsteady path between the two. And yet we
hold fast to the conviction that the Christian and
the human are not in conﬂict with one another.
Often we may not be able to discern intellectually the harmony which exists between the two,
far less be able to demonstrate it in our lives; nevertheless, we believe and we continue to believe in
the reconciliation and agreement of the two. The
Christian is the true man, on every front and in every domain. Christianity is not opposed to nature,
but to sin. Christ came, not to destroy the works of
the Father, but only those of the devil.93

One day, however, the problems surrounding the
relation of human to Christian will ﬁnd their deﬁnitive resolution. This will happen in the status gloriae, in which the whole dispensation of grace will
have served its purpose and will therefore cease.
With this eschatological insight we will deal in the
following section.
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Notes
1. Cf. E. P. Heideman, The Relation of Revelation to Reason in
E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Assen, 1959), who observes
in his analysis of this theme (pp. 191ff.) that Bavinck’s
idea “that grace does not abolish nature, but renews
and restores it…may be called the central thought of
Bavinck’s theology” (p. 196).
2. De offerande des lofs (11th impression, Kampen, n.d. [1st
ed. 1901]), pp. 44f.
3. The Philosophy of Revelation (Grand Rapids, 1953), p.
243 (Dutch: p. 208). For a general indication of
the problematics cf. also De vrouw in de hedendaagsche
maatschappij (Kampen, 1918), p. 28, and “Calvin and
common grace,” in Calvin and the Reformation (London
and Edinburgh, 1909), pp. 99f., as well as the ﬁfth
thesis of a lecture on creation and re-creation, an
extensive report of which appeared in De Heraut
Heraut, no.
1037 (Nov. 7, 1897). This report was reprinted in De
Bazuin XLV, 47 (Nov. 19, 1897). The theses of this
lecture are particularly instructive for the nature/grace
theme.
4. De Bazuin XLVIII, 12 (March 23, 1900). Cf. also
Offerande des lofs
lofs, p. 45.
5. “De Theologie van Albrecht Ritschl,” Theologische
Studiën VI (1888), 397. Emphasis added. Later, in his
Dogmatics (IV 703), Bavinck still says that Ritschl’s
accentuation of the “diesseitige Weltstellung des
Menschen” represents an important truth over against
the abstract super-naturalism of the Greek and Roman
church.
6. For nutshell characterizations of Roman Catholicism
and its doctrine see, apart from many passages in
the Dogmatics, “Calvin and common grace,” pp. 104108; Het Christendom (Baarn, 1912), pp. 31-38; and
Bavinck’s “Algemeene Inleiding” in Kerkhervorming,
commemorative volume at the fourth centennial, a
publication of the Reformed Tract Society “Philippus,”
1917, pp. 10-29. In these discussions also Bavinck
deals extensively with the Roman Catholic view of
the nature/grace relation. To keep the footnotes
within reasonable limits we will hereafter refer
only occasionally to these passages. Note Bavinck’s
remarkable characterization of the Roman Catholic
system as a “system of complementation”: “The
Roman Catholic system, at heart Pelagian, is one
great system of complementation; the image of God
complements man, grace complements nature, the
evangelical counsels complement the moral precepts.
Moreover, this system continues within Christianity:
Paul complements Christ, the mass complements
his sacriﬁce, tradition complements the Scriptures,
human ordinance complements God’s command,
love complements faith, the merits of the saints
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complement the shortcomings of the weak.” De
katholiciteit van christendom en kerk (Kampen, 1888), p.
20 [ET 229-230].
7. Ibid
Ibid., pp. 9f. [ET 224].
8. Ibid
Ibid., p. 17 [ET 228].
9. Ibid.,
Ibid p. 18 [ET 228]. Bavinck argues against Harnack,
Hatch, and Sohm that not only the gospel but even
the Christian church (at least in its ﬁrst period) was
not ascetic. See “Calvin and common grace,” pp. 101ff.
On asceticism in the early church cf. also IV, 330; Het
christelijk huisgezin (Kampen, 1908), pp. 67ff.; Philosophy
of Revelation, pp. 247f. (Dutch, 208f.); Kennis en leven
(Kampen, 1922) pp. 117ff.
10. Katholiciteit
Katholiciteit, p. 18 [ET 229].
11. Ibid
Ibid., p. 19 [ET 229].
12. De algemeene genade (Kampen, 1894), pp. 20f. [ET 47].
13. Ibid
Ibid., p. 22 [ET 48].
14. Ibid.,
Ibid 21f. [ET 47f.]. For hierarchy as basic idea cf.
Het Christendom, p. 38. Bavinck writes in “Calvin and
common grace” p. 107: “The whole hierarchical idea
is built on the sharp distinction between nature and
grace.”
15. De algemeene genade, p 21. Cf. Kennis en leven, p. 135:
asceticism is always based on a Pelagian holiness of
works.
16. Katholiciteit,
Katholiciteit p. 21[ET 231]. Cf. Ouders of getuigen
(Kampen, 1901), p. 40 and Huisgezin, p. 71: “The
Christian element does not permeate the natural, but
remains suspended above it; the natural is not renewed
but only repressed by it;…the leaven is spread out over
the dough, but is not kneaded into the bread, so that
it is leavened throughout.” Cf. also Bede en rede (with
P. Biesterveld; Kampen, 1898), p. 39 and Bavinck’s
review of Huizinga’s Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen [Eng. tr.
The Waning of the Middle Ages
Ages] in Stemmen des Tijds IX
(1920) 237, in which he says that Huizinga’s book takes
us into a world of contrasts: ‘The supernatural and
the natural stand next to each other in a quantitative,
dualistic way, and cannot be reconciled. Each
triumphs in turn. The harmony of life is missing; and
both Humanism and the Reformation are attempts,
each in its own way, to recover it. Cf. Christelijke
wetenschap (Kampen, 1904), p. 19: in the Middle Ages
the natural “was externally repressed, not internally
sanctiﬁed”; cf. De algemeene genade, p.24 [ET 49]. See
also note 18. Bavinck’s analysis of the doctrine of
nature and grace has undoubtedly had a seminal
inﬂuence on the analysis given in the philosophy of
the cosmonomic idea, especially by H. Dooyeweerd.
Dooyeweerd distinguishes four religious groundmotives in the development of European philosophic
thought : the Greek form/matter motive; the biblical

ground-motive of creation, Fall and redemption; the
Scholastic ground-motive of nature and grace; and
the humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom.
See H. Dooyeweerd, “De vier religieuze grondthema’s
in den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgeerig denken
van het avondland,” Philosophia Reformata VI (1946)
161-179. As a contribution to the structural analysis
of the classical Roman Catholic conception, Bavinck’s
approach retains its signiﬁcance to this day. Nor
is its value diminished, in my view, by the intensive
reassessment in later Roman Catholic theology of the
questions concerning the relation of nature and grace.
On the more recent Roman Catholic discussions, cf.
M.C. Smit, De verhouding van Christendom en historie in
de huidige roomskatholieke geschiedbeschouwing (Kampen,
1950), p. 27ff.; G.C. Berkouwer, “Identiteit of Conﬂict?
Een poging tot analyse,” Philosophia Reformata XXI
(1956) 1-44; Karl Rahner, “Natur und Gnade” in
Fragen der Theologie heute (herausgegeben von Johannes
Feiner, Josef Trütsch und Franz Böckle: EinsiedelnZürich-Köln, 1957), pp. 209-230.
17. De algemeene genade, p. 23 [ET 48]; I 330 [ET 1.360];
IV 470. On the juxtaposition of the natural and the
supernatural order, as this shapes the entire Roman
Catholic view of man, cf. De algemeene genade, pp.
20ff. [ET 47ff.]. For the characteristically Roman
Catholic tendency toward world-ﬂight on the one
hand, and toward world domination on the other
(both of which arise out of the same dualism), cf. I
330ff. [ET 1.360ff.]; De algemeene genade, pp. 23f. [ET
48f]; Verzamelde Opstellen, pp. 96f., Kennis en leven, pp.
134f. In Verzamelde Opstellen,, pp. 96f
96f. Bavinck writes:
“Both were born out of a dualism between matter and
spirit which is derived, not from Scripture, but from
the philosophy of Plato, and which was transferred
within Christianity, in proportion as it became Roman
Catholic, to the distinction of the natural and the
supernatural.”
18. Katholiciteit,
Katholiciteit p. 28 [ET 235]. On a number of occasions
Bavinck pictures the Reformation as part of the
emancipation movement which came to the fore
toward the end of the Middle Ages; cf. Katholiciteit,
Katholiciteit
pp. 28f. [ET 235f.] Bede en rede, pp. 39f.; Christelijke
Wetenschap, p. 19, and especially Verzamelde Opstellen,
p. 97. However, in these and other passages (e.g.
De algemeene genade pp. 24f. [ET 49f.]), Bavinck also
emphasizes the speciﬁcally religious character of
the Reformation, by which it differed fundamentally
from Humanism. Cf. “Algemeene Inleiding” in De
Kerkhervorming, p. 30: The Reformers “did not contend
for the freedom of the natural, but of the Christian
man,” cf. ibid., p. 7. Of particular interest is Bavinck’s
criticism of the views of Troeltsch on Old and New
Protestantism, and the difference between the two.
The element of truth in this lies in the recognition of

the fundamental difference between Reformation and
Revolution. For the Reformation, in contrast with the
Enlightenment, continued to move within the bounds
of historic Christianity; it had no other concern than
to restore this Christianity in its purity. Materially, the
Reformation is closer to Roman Catholicism than to
the Revolution. But Bavinck objects to the view that
the Reformation in fact remained medieval. This is to
fall into two misconceptions, in his view. The ﬁrst is
the identiﬁcation of the supernaturalism of medieval
Catholicism with the supernatural character that has
distinguished Christianity from the beginning. The
Reformation retained the latter, but brought about
a fundamental and radical change in the medieval
conception of the relation between supernatural
revelation and nature. The second misconception
consists in the failure to do justice, in this approach, to
the originality and the signiﬁcance of the Reformation
(ibid
(ibid
ibid.,., pp. 6ff., cf. also Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 3ff.
[Dutch, pp. 2ff.]. This originality of the Reformation
emerges especially in the fact that it replaced the
quantitative opposition of the natural and the
supernatural with the qualitative one of sin and grace;
cf. I 331 [ET 1.361], IV 390f., Ouders of getuigen, 49f.
19. “Calvin and common grace,” p. 127. On the
signiﬁcance of the Reformation for ethics, cf. De ethiek
van Ulrich Zwingli (Kampen 1880), pp. 3ff.
20. De algemeene genade, p. 44 [ET 60].
21. Katholiciteit,
Katholiciteit p. 29 [ET 236]. Cf. Johannes Calvijn
(Kampen, 1909), pp. 33f. and Bijbelsche en religieuze
psychologie (Kampen, 1920), p. 90: the Reformation in
principle overcame the dualism of spirit and matter.
On the healthy piety of the Reformers, cf. Katholiciteit,
Katholiciteit
pp. 29f. [ET 237f.] and De zekerheid des geloofs (Kampen,
1901), pp. 42f. [ET 38f.].
22. Katholiciteit
Katholiciteit, p. 30 [ET 236].
23. III 581 [ET 3.577].
24. III 582 [ET 3.577, where ‘another grace’ should read
‘no other grace.’].
25. III 583f. [3.578f.]. On the Roman Catholic concept
of grace in its opposition to that of the Reformation,
cf. II 499ff. [ET 2.537ff.], III 513 [ET 3.517], IV 423,
473ff., and especially Roeping en Wedergeboorte (Kampen,
1903), pp. 195ff.
26. Katholiciteit,
Katholiciteit p. 32 [ET 237f]. Cf. also above Chapter I,
section 3.3 and the present chapter 2, section 2a, note
40. One of Bavinck’s criticisms of Calvin concerns
the latter’s conception of the relation between church
and state, cf. e.g. Johannes Calvijn, p. 24. On Bavinck’s
preference for Calvin above Luther and Zwingli, cf.
also, besides the passage referred to in my article
“Calvijn en Bavinck,” Opbouw III, 15 (July 10, 1959);
IV 390ff.; Our Reasonable Faith (Grand Rapids, 1956),
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pp. 125f. (Dutch: Magnalia Dei [Kampen, 1931], pp.
111f.), “Calvin and common grace,” pp. 11ff., 123 and
especially Bavinck’s speech on September 22, 1892
at the Fifth General Council of the Alliance of the
Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian System,
held in Toronto, September 21-30, 1892. See the
Proceedings of this Council (London, 1892), pp. 48-55,
especially pp. 49ff.; cf. the account of this speech in
V. Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam, 1921), pp.
215ff. Bavinck’s view of Luther is criticized by G.T.
Rothuizen, Primus usus legis; studie over het burgerlijk gebruik
van de wet (Kampen, 1962), pp. 47f., and W. Krusche,
Das Wirken des Heiligen Geistes nach Calvin (Berlin, 1957),
p. 98.
27. De algemeene genade, pp. 30ff. [ET 53ff.]. Cf. I 158f. [ET
1.183f.], Our Reasonable Faith, p. 126 (Dutch: p. 112), and
Het Christendom, pp. 49ff. On Anabaptism, cf. the places
listed in the Register of IV and furthermore especially
Roeping en Wedergeboorte, pp. 98ff., 145, 148f. Like Roman
Catholicism, Anabaptism is based on the opposition of
nature and grace: “The difference is that Anabaptism
makes that opposition absolute and thus annihilates
nature; Roman Catholicism “views the opposition as
a relative one, and suppresses nature,” IV 396, cf. 415:
Roman Catholicism does not look upon the natural as
sinful, as Anabaptism does, but teaches that the natural
is of a lower order; for this view of Roman Catholicism
cf. also Verzamelde Opstellen, p. 97. For a comparison of
Calvinism, Lutheranism, and Anabaptism, see Alliance
Proceedings, pp. 52f.
Proceedings
28. De algemeene genade, p. 33 [ET 54]. For the various
movements mentioned in the text, cf. the passages listed
in the Register of IV. On Pietism cf. also Zekerheid des
geloofs, pp. 39ff. [ET 41ff.]; (see what follows in the text)
geloofs
and section 3, 2ff. below; on the previously mentioned
Moravians, discussed together with the Methodists, cf.
Zekerheid des geloofs
geloofs, pp. 49ff. [ET 45ff.]. On Methodism,
cf. also Roeping en Wedergeboorte, pp. 172ff.; on asceticism
in Roman Catholicism, Anabaptism, Pietism and
Methodism, cf. Paedagogische Beginselen (Kampen,
1904), pp. 31f., cf. Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie, p. 147.
Bavinck writes in IV 417: “Avoidance is the word of
the Anabaptists; ascetism that of the Roman Catholics;
renewal and sanctiﬁcation that of the Protestant,
particularly of the Reformed Christian.”
29. Katholiciteit, pp. 44f. [ET 246f.]; cf. the corresponding
passage in III 571.

Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck, p. 147: “No doubt you
have received my oration. Bear in mind as you read it
that it is especially meant as a kind of antidote to the
separatistic and sectarian tendencies which sometimes
manifest themselves in our church. There is so much
narrow-mindedness, so much parochialism among
us, and the worst of it is that this counts for piety.”
J.H. Gunning II, Het protestansche Nederland
Nederland, 65, n.1,
made the following comment about Katholiciteit: “One
hardly believes his eyes if he reads Dr. Bavinck’s
rectorial oration The Catholicity of Christianity and the
Church (1888) and bears in mind that this beautiful,
truly broad conception of Theology and Scholarship
is being entertained and defended in the auditorium of
the Kampen Theological Seminary. What will be the
result in ecclesiastical practice if Dr. Bavinck’s students
attempt to bring into effect these splendid principles of
their teacher?” We would like to draw attention also,
at this point, to the important judgment on Katholiciteit
made by H. Berkhof in his work De Katholiciteit der
Kerk (Nijkerk, 1962), pp. 20f. After pointing out that
the rise to dominance of the doctrine of the invisible
church in the nineteenth century had led to a waning
of interest in the visible church, and consequently also
in its catholicity, Berkhof writes that Katholiciteit
Katholiciteit, to his
knowledge, is the “only important exception” to this
rule. “We ﬁnd in it a genuine renewal of the idea of
catholicity. The oration is distinctive, on the one hand,
by its liberality and breadth, and on the other, by its
modernity.” It is noteworthy (to make a parenthetical
observation) that Berkhof fails to mention Gunning
in this connection. Berkhof is correct in making the
observation that Bavinck in his oration uses the word
“catholicity” in a double sense – in the ﬁrst place in the
meaning of the contemporary word “ecumenicity,” and
in the second place in the markedly qualitative meaning
of “sanctiﬁcation of the whole of earthly reality.” But
a qualiﬁcation must be made when Berkhof goes on
to say that Bavinck’s oration has an isolated position
even within his own literary output. It is true enough
of catholicity in the ﬁrst sense (Bavinck indeed has
only isolated statements on the “ecumenicity” of
the church), but it is not true (as this whole section
demonstrates) of catholicity in the broader, qualitative
sense. It is clear, however, that the use of the concept
in this sense is concerned less with the catholicity of
the church than with the catholicity of revelation, or
of Christianity and faith.

30. Katholiciteit
Katholiciteit, pp. 47f. [ET 248f.].

35. De algemeene genade, p. 45 [ET 60].

31. De algemeene genade, p. 47 ET 62].

36. Ibid.,
Ibid p 48 [ET 62]. This saying is also repeatedly quoted
by Bavinck in the Latin form of the famous Thomistic
thesis: Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perﬁcit
cit. On this thesis,
as it functions in Roman Catholic theology, cf. O.
Weber, Grundlagen der Dogmatik (Neukirchen, 1955-62),
I 693 and II 582, who also indicates the possibility of

32. Katholiciteit
Katholiciteit, pp. 48f. [ET 248f.].
33. Cf. Katholiciteit
Katholiciteit, p. 49 [ET 249].
34. Cf. what Bavinck writes about the oration Katholiciteit
to his friend Snouck Hurgronje, as quoted in V.
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using the thesis in another sense, ibid
ibid., I 471 and 639, n.
1. When Bavinck renders perﬁcit as “restores,” it is plain
that this involves a certain modiﬁcation of the original
meaning; cf. F. H. von Meyenfeldt, “Prof. Dr. Herman
Bavinck: 1854-1954 ‘Christus en cultuur’,” Polemios I,
21 (Oct. 15, 1954), p. 110, n. 11.
37. “Inleiding,” in Christendom en opvoeding (Baarn, 1908),
p. 9. It should be noted that Bavinck (as is evident from
the foregoing) often uses the concepts Christianity,”
“religion,” etc. as equivalents of “revelation.”
38. Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (Kampen, 1913), p. 89; cf.
IV, 358. On the law-gospel relation in this connection,
cf. the following section.
39. IV 675f.
40. II 508 [ET 2.547].
41. III 575 [ET 3.571].
42. Our Reasonable Faith, p. 528 (Dutch: p. 507).
43. III 577 [ET 3.573].
44. Cf. Offerande des lofs
lofs, pp. 43f. and Het christelijk huisgezin,
pp. 57ff.
45. De Bazuin XLIX, 43 (October 25, 1901). This article,
entitled “Openbaring en rede” is actually a review of a
publication by A. Anema, but in fact Bavinck takes this
as an occasion to set forth his own views. Heideman
did not make use of this article. But its import (see
the text) is in complete accord with his ﬁndings. In
addition, cf. I 588 [ET 1.618]: revelation does not
conﬂict with human reason per se, but only per accidens
corruptionis et pravae dispositionis.
46. Bede en rede, p. 34. Cf. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 107
(Dutch: p. 91): “The doctrine of creation maintains
the divinity, the goodness and sacredness of all
created things.” The recognition of creation opens the
possibility for man of a “free and royal relation” to
nature, devoid of both the deiﬁcation and the contempt
of nature. ((Ibid
Ibid.. 105f., Dutch: 89ff. On the love of God
Ibid
cf. section “g” below.
47. Bede en rede, pp. 35f.
48. Ibid
Ibid., p. 40.
49. De a1gemeene genade, p. 47 [ET 61].
50. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 267 (Dutch: p. 229). On
Christ’s appreciation of natural life, which he saves
through His work of redemption, cf. Offerande des lofs
lofs,
pp. 49ff.; Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 255ff. (Dutch: pp.
219ff.); Verzamelde Opstellen, pp. 133ff.
51. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 267 (Dutch: p. 230).
52. Offerande des lofs
lofs, p. 52. cf. Katholiciteit
Katholiciteit, p. 10 [ET 223]:
“Christianity is the religion of the cross. The mystery
of suffering is its centre…. Nevertheless, the reverse

side is not missing. The cross may cast a shadow over
all of nature, but the resurrection shines its light also
over it.” Cf. “Calvin and common grace,” p. 101.
53. III 280f. [ET 3.297f.].
54. Kennis en leven, p. 39.
55. Our Reasonable Faith, p. 325 (Dutch: p. 307).
56. De vrouw in de hedendaagsche maatschappij
maatschappij, p. 27. In
rejecting dualism, Bavinck elsewhere mentions
creation, incarnation and resurrection in one breath.
In Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie, pp. 57f., he writes:
“Creation, incarnation and resurrection are conclusive
proofs that spirit and matter, however they may differ,
are susceptible to union and cooperation.” Cf. also
ibid., p. 90. As we noted above, under section “a,”
ibid
Bavinck was of the opinion that the possibility of the
incarnation was given with creation. H. M. Kuitert,
De mensvormigheid Gods (Kampen, 1962), p. 116, n.
113, puts it well: for Bavinck “the whole creation is a
paradigmatic combination-possibility between matter
and spirit, and for that reason the possibility-ground
for the incarnation.”
57. Ibid., p. 127. Bavinck’s high view of the body is striking,
cf. II 521 [ET 2.559]: “The body is no prison, but a
wonderful art-piece of God almighty, which constitutes
the nature of man as much as the soul does.” Bavinck
even says that it is “characteristically Reformed not to
neglect the body,” De Jongelingsvereeniging in hare beteekenis
voor het sociale leven (1917), p. 4. On the rejection of
asceticism and dualism in connection with the family,
cf. Huisgezin,, pp. 113f. Bavinck here ((ibid., pp. 114f.)
also draws attention to the naturalness with which
the Scriptures speak about sexuality. They adopt the
standpoint of a “healthy realism,” although on the
other hand they also avoid all libertinism.
58. De algemeene genade, pp. 45f. [ET 60f.].
59. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 231, cf. 306f. (Dutch: p. 197,
cf. 265).
60. Ibid
Ibid., p 265 (Dutch: pp. 306).
61. Christelijk wereldbeschouwing, p. 86; cf. Bijbelsche en religieuze
psychologie, p. 90.
62. II 535 [ET 2.574]. Cf. Verzamelde Opstellen, p. 107:
Christianity conceived of the disharmony in the world
“as a temporal, occasional deformitas
deformitas, and explained it,
not in terms of the nature of things, of materia, but
in terms of the anomaly, the anomia of things; i.e.,
not physically, but ethically.” For the non-substantial
character of grace Bavinck’s comments on regeneration
at IV 69 are instructive. Among other things, he says
there, Christ is “not a second Creator,” but “Reformer
of all things.” A good analysis of Bavinck’s concept of
substance was given by J. M. Spier in a long series of
articles on the concept of substance in the paper Pro
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Ecclesia VI–VII (1940–1942). Articles XIX–XXV and
XXIX deal with Bavinck.
63. Huisgezin, pp. 82f., cf. “Calvin and common grace,” p.
128.
64. Verzamelde Opstellen, p. 149. Cf. II 538 [ET 2.578].
65. Verzamelde Opstellen, pp. 149f. Bavinck identiﬁed his
position with the names of the two Protestant political
parties existing at that time in the Netherlands,
namely the Christian-Historical Union and the AntiRevolutionary Party. “Christian” refers to the constant
standpoint, and “historical” to change, whereas “antirevolutionary” gives the additional qualiﬁcation that
the Christian-historical principles must be practically
applied, not by means of a radical revolution but by
a reformation which retains the good ((ibid
ibid.,., p. 150).
ibid
For an eloquent defense of reformation as opposed
to repristination, cf. Christelijke en neutrale staatkunde
(Hilversum, 1905), p. 30.

term “sphere-sovereignty,” although he advocates
the conception itself. Bavinck not only advocates the
conception, but on a number of occasions also uses
the term; cf. Kennis en leven, pp. 48, 201: De Bazuin L, 15
(Apr. 11, 1902).
75. De algemeene genade, p. 51 [ET 64]. Cf. Philosophy of
Revelation, p. 258 (Dutch: p. 222): the Gospel is not
opposed to culture, but is “the most important element
of all culture,—principle and goal of what all culture
in the genuine sense of the word strives after, and must
strive after.”
76. De algemeene genade, p. 52 [ET 64]. Cf. above section
“2d.”
77. On scholarship cf. Bede en Rede, p. 37 and Christelijke
wetenschap, p. 121.
78. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 269 (Dutch: p. 231).
79. Cf. below section 3, 1 (j) aa.

66. IV 376.

80. Evangelisatie (Utrecht, 1913), p. 30.

67. De algemeene genade, p. 43 [ET 59]. According to Bavinck,
the Reformed theologians had a better insight into
this than the Lutherans; cf. the characterization of
both standpoints in II 533ff. [ET 2.572ff.] and III
582 [ET 3.577]. Cf. the objections of W. Trillhaas,
Dogmatik (Berlin, 1962), p. 248, against the “Restitutio
nschristologie,” which he ﬁnds, in a speciﬁc form, “im
neuen Luthertum, besonders in dessen bürgerlichen
Ausprägung etwa durch die Ritschlsche Theologie.”

81. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 266 (Dutch: p. 229).

68. Cf. Berkouwer’s comments on the notion of “elevatio,”
partially in connection with H. Berkhof’s objections
against the exclusive defense of the traditional
“restoration” theme ((De
De wederkomst van Christus II
[Kampen, 1963], pp. 267ff.).

88. Ibid.,
Ibid p. 102. For this idea see section “2d” above.
On the combination of faith and science, cf. e.g.,
Paedagogische beginselen, p. 52, and on faith and politics
Christelijke en neutrale staatkunde, pp. 39f.

69. III 163 [3.182].
70. III 582 [3.577].
71. Our Reasonable Faith, p. 144 (Dutch: pp. 128f.); cf. I
347f. [1.376f.] and II 400 [2.436].
72. The impact of the basic theme on the doctrine of the
covenant was noted above, under section 2.
73. Cf. IV 698ff. Bavinck’s entire eschatology could
be considered an elaboration of what he says in De
algemeene genade, p. 46, about the Christian religion: “It
does not make a new cosmos, but makes the cosmos
new.”
74. Ibid.,
Ibid pp. 50f. The church does not stand above these
life-spheres, as Roman Catholicism teaches, but next
to them. Domination over the church by the state, or
domination over the state by the church are therefore
both illegitimate ((ibid
ibid.).
ibid
.). S. P. van der Walt, Die wijsbegeerte
van Dr. Herman Bavinck (Potchefstroom, 1953), p. 136,
n. 18 mistakenly claims that Bavinck never uses the
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82. Ibid
Ibid., p. 242 (Dutch: p. 207).
83. I 332 [ET 1.362].
84. Offerande des lofs
lofs, p. 53.
85. Zekerheid des geloofs
geloofs, p. 99 [ET 93].
86. Ibid
Ibid., p. 100 [ET 94].
87. Ibid
Ibid., p 101f. [95f.].

89. Zekerheid des geloofs
geloofs, p. 103 [ET 96f.].
90. On the Reformation’s revaluation of one’s earthly
vocation, cf. Paedagogische beginselen, p. 96, “Calvin and
common grace,” p. 123. Cf. also IV 703f.
91. De algemeene genade, pp 48f. [ET 62f.].
92. Cf. e.g. Christelijke wetenschap, pp. 107f. and Paedagogische
beginselen, pp. 30ff. (“the beautiful text”) and 49ff. (a
very important passage for our theme). For criticism
of Bavinck’s use of this text, see S.O. Los, Moderne
paedagogen en richtingen (Amsterdam, 1933), pp. l73f.
On the relationship of the christianum to the humanum,
Bavinck’s words in Paedagogigche beginselen, p. 50, are
of interest: “Christianity and humanity are one.” In
this context, Bavinck evidently means by these words
that Christianity is the true humanity, not vice versa.
Whether he accepts or rejects the converse (i.e., the
idea that true humanity is ipso facto Christian) cannot
be determined with complete certainty. For on the one
hand, Bavinck says ((Hedendaagsche
Hedendaagsche moraal [Kampen,

1902], p. 51), “Humanity without divinity turns
into bestiality.” Yet on the other hand, he writes ((De
welsprekendheid [Kampen, 1889], p. 64), “Whatsoever
things are true, or good, or lovely among our
opponents, whatsoever things are of good report, in
whatever area, in the domain of art and science, that is
Christian.”
93. De Bazuin L, 41 (Sept. 26, 1902). On the theme of
human and Christian, cf. already De ethiek van Ulrich
Zwingli, p. 1.
Zwingli
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14, 16 donum superadditum – “gift added on”
14

visio Dei – “vision of God”

15

foedus gratiae – “covenant of grace”

16

ut elevet et sanet – “to elevate and heal”

16, 20 per accidens – “by ‘accident’” [cf. p. 20], i.e. “incidentally,” “non-essentially”
16

ex condigno – “by merit”

16, 21 forma – “form”
17

gratia specialis – “special grace”

17, 23 gratia communis – “common grace”
18

Afgescheiden (Dutch) – “Secessionist,” i.e. belonging
to the 1834 Secession or Afscheiding from the Dutch
Established Church.

18

leitmotif (German) – “dominant recurring theme”

18

Erlösungsreligion (German) – “religion of redemption”

18

reparatio – “restoration”

18

elevation naturae – “elevation of nature”

20

privatio – “lack,” “absence”

20

privatio actuosa – “active lack”

23

principium – “principle”

24

natura commendat gratiam, gratia emendat naturam – “nature commends grace, grace emends nature”

25
—
note

status gloriae – “state of glory”

5

diesseitige Weltstellung des Menschen (German) – “the position of man in this [earthly] world”

36 gratia non tollit naturam, sed perﬁcit – “grace does not
abolish nature, but perfects it.”
45 per accidens corruptionis et pravae dispositionis – “by the ‘accident’ [cf. p. 11] of corruption and evil disposition”
62 deformitas – “deformity,” “misshapenness”
62 anomia (Greek) – “lawlessness”
67 im neuen Luthertum, besonders in dessen bürgerlichen
Ausprägung etwa durch die Ritschlsche Theologie (German)
– “in modern Lutheranism, especially in its bourgeois
expression, for example in the theology of Ritschl.”
92 ipso facto – “by the very fact”
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